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41-6-43

MOTOR VEHICLES

sentence; substituted "any accident" for "an
accident" in the first sentence; substituted
"municipal department" for "city department" in two places; inserted "written"

before "report" in the first sentence; and
added "on accidents occurring within their
jurisdiction" to the first sentence.

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND
RECKLESS DRIVING
Section
Powers of focal authorities.
Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one year - Penalty - Revocation
of license or privilege to drive.
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug - Presumption arising from alco41-6-44.
holic content of blood - Basis of percentage by weight of alcohol - Criminal
punishment - Arrest without warrant - Revocation of license.
41-6-44.2.
Driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or higher unlawful - Penalty.
41-6-44.3.
Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence.
41-6-44.5.
Driving while intoxicated - Chemical tests as evidence - Presumption of blood
alcohol level.
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow Warning, report, revocation of license - Court action on revocation - Person
incapable of refusal - Results of test available - Who may give test - Evidence.
41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in motor vehicle prohibited Definitions - Exceptions - Penalty for violation.
41-6-45.
Reckless driving - Penalty.
41-6-43.
41-6-43.10.

41-6-43. Powers of local authorities. (a) Local authorities may by
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is under
the influence of alcohol, or who has a blood alcohol content of .10% or
greater, or who is under the influence of any drug or combined influence
of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable
of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle within this state, for the use of a chemical test or tests and for
evidentiary presumptions, and for penalties consistent with sections
41-6-44 and 41-6-44.2.
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person
who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving, and provide penalties consistent with section 41-6-45.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, § 12.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 54 repealed old section
41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110;
L. 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch.
107, § 1), relating to powers of local authorities as to driving while intoxicated and reckless driving, and new section 41-6-43 was
enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 12.

Cross-References.
Traffic regulations, powers and duties of
cities as to, 10-8-30:
Effect of interim repeal.
The interim repeal of this section did not
render municipalities without authority to
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under
the influence of alcohol as municipalities had
authority under their general police powers
to enact such ordinances in the absence of a
specific legislative grant of authority. Layton
City v. Glines (1980) 616 P 2d 588.
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Powers of cities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt
Lake City v. Kusse (1938) 97 U 113, 93 P 2d
671.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ~ 332.

41-6-43.10

61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 625-637.
Driving while intoxicated or under influence of liquor or drugs, 7A AmJur 2d 478 et
seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296
et seq.
Constitutionality of legislative delegation
of powers to prescribe or vary regulations
concerning motor vehicles used on highways,
87 ALR 546.

41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one year
- Penalty - Revocation of license or privilege to drive. (a) When the
death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury
received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety
of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent
homicide.
(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of
not less than $100 nor more than $1,000,or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any
nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide.
Construction.
A defendant is guilty of reckless disregard
for the safety of others if the evidence supCompiler's Notes.
ports a finding that the defendant consciously chose a course of action knowing
The 1957 amendment inserted "in the
that such course would place his guest in
county jail" in subsec. (b).
grave and serious danger or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose such danger to
Title of Act.
An act amending sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7, any reasonable person. This does not require
41-6-8, 41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, a finding that defendant was fully conscious
41-6-49, 41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, of the great danger to others since the stat41-6-90, 41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121, ute does not require an intentional accident
41-6-123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, nor the choosing of a highly dangerous
41-6-133, 41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, course while fully conscious or aware of the
danger in following such course. State v.
41-6-159, and 27-1-28, Utah Code Annotated
Berchtold (1960) 11 U 2d 208, 357 P 2d 183.
1953; repealing and re-enacting sections
Inattentive driving in the face of grave
41-6-14, 41-6-64, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-134,
41-6-135, 41-6-140, and 41-6-144, Utah Code danger constitutes reckless disregard for the
safety of others. State v. Berchtold (1960) 11
Annotated 1953; enacting new sections
41-6-43.10,41-6-72.10,41-6-121.10,41-6-140.10, U 2d 208, 357 P 2d 183.
The term "reckless disregard" requires a
41-6-140.20, and 41-6-154.10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953; and repealing section 27-9-8, much greater degree of disregard for the
Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to the safety of others than does ordinary lack of
regulation of traffic on highways, and defin- due care for such safety, or mere negligence.
ing certain crimes in the use and operation of State v. Berchtold (1960) 11 U 2d 208, 357 P
vehicles, prescribing the equipment used on 2d 183.
vehicles and requiring the giving of notice of Double jeopardy.
accidents by operators or occupants of motor
Where a defendant originally was charged
vehicles involved. - Laws 1955, ch. 71.
with negligent homicide under this section
and, after a preliminary hearing, the charge
Cross-References.
was dismissed and he was charged, tried, and
Automobile homicide, 76-5-207.
convicted of automobile homicide under
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10,enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2.
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former 76-30-7.4, he was not placed twice. in
jeopardy by being tried for automobile homicide after dismissal of the lesser charge.
State v. Romero (1961) 12 U 2d 210, 364 P 2d
828.
Evidence.
Where a defendant was charged with
negligent homicide because he ran a red light
and was involved in an intersection collision,
he should have been allowed to introduce evidence of other similar accidents occurring at
the same intersection, and the city traffic
engineer, as an expert, should have been permitted to testify as to the lenses in the
semaphore signal and their tendency to cause
"sun phantom." State v. Stewart (1961) 12 U
2d 273, 365 P 2d 785.
Where the evidence showed that from the
length of defendant's skid marks the police
estimated his speed to have been 55 to 65
miles per hour at the time his auto struck
and killed a pedestrian in a 35-mile-per-hour
zone, and that the defendant was familiar
with the area and should have realized that
people might be crossing the highway in the
area, there was sufficient evidence upon
which the trial court could base its finding
that defendant was guilty of negligent homicide. State v. Park (1965) 17 U 2d 90, 404 P 2d
677.
Where evidence showed that defendant
knew of stop sign and restricted view at
intersection where the collision occurred, and
that, whether or not defendant ran the stop

sign, he was traveling in excess of forty miles
per hour when he reached the point of
impact, and that the two vehicles were so
close together when defendant entered the
intersection that the driver of the other auto
had no opportunity to apply her brakes prior
to the collision, such evidence was sufficient
to show conduct evincing a reckless disregard
for the safety of others. State v. Selman
(1966) 18 U 2d 199, 417 P 2d 975.
View of tragedy.
Defendant, convicted of negligent homicide
by automobile under this section, was not
prejudiced because, at the instance of the
state, a view by the jury of the site of the
tragedy was had under former 77-31-26 and
the participation of the trial court thereat in
asking numerous questions of prosecution
witnesses, where the record showed that the
judge showed unusual sympathy for defendant, an apparent hotrodder, including the
sentencing of defendant to but sixty days,
servable on weekends. State v. Delaney (1964)
15 U 2d 338, 393 P 2d 379.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ¢o> 342, 344.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 657-671.
7A AmJur 2d 518, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 333.
What amounts to negligent homicide
within me;ining of statutes penalizing negligent homicide by operation of a motor vehicle, 20 ALR 3d 473.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug - Presumption arising from alcoholic content of blood - Basis of percentage by weight of alcohol - Criminal punishment - Arrest without
warrant - Revocation of license. (a) It is unlawful and punishable as
provided in subsection (d) of this section for any person who is under the
influence of alcohol, or who is under the influence of any drug or combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this state. The fact that any person charged with
violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of this
section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
or in any civil suit or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been
committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the amount of alcohol in the
person's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the
person's blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
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(1) If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under
the influence of alcohol;
(2) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than
0.08 per cent by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, such fact shall
not give rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under
the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence
of alcohol;
(3) If there was at the time 0.08 per cent or more by weight of alcohol
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the
influence of alcohol;
(4) The foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not be construed
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon
the question whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol.
(c) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams
of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(d) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than 30 days nor more than six
months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both,
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated said vehicle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, and, in the
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. For the purposes
of this section, the standard of negligence shall be that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(e) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section, the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided
in subsection (d), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than two
nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the
jail, or require the person to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility for
not less than two nor more than 10 days. Upon a subsequent conviction
within five years after a second conviction under this section, the court
shall, in addition to the penalties provided in subsection (d), impose a
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 10 nor more than 30 days with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person
to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility for not less than 10 nor more
than 30 days. No portion of any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection ·
(d) shall be suspended nor shall the convicted person be eligible for parole
or probation until such time as the sentence provided for in this subsection
has been served.
(f) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or collision in which such person ir;;involved and when such violation has, in fact,
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been committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.
(g) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license
of any person convicted under this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, § 1;
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch.
268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, § 2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted subsecs. (b)
and (c); redesignated former subsec. (b) as
(d); and made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1957 amendment deleted provisions
applying to first, second or subsequent convictions in subsec. (d); added the proviso to
subsec. (d); and deleted "or under an ordinance as provided by section 41-6-43 (a)" at
the end of the section.
The 1967 amendment deleted references to
narcotic drugs in subsec. (a); changed the
blood alcohol content from 0.15% to 0.08%;
inserted "or be in actual physical control" in
subsec. (c); added subsec. (e); and made
minor changes in phraseology.
The 1969 amendment inserted "or in any
civil suit * * * under the influence of intoxicating liquor" in subsec. (b); deleted "urine"
before "breath" in the first sentence of
subsec. (b); substituted "whether the person
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor" in subd. (b)2 for "the guilt or innocence
of the person"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation.
The 1977 amendment substituted "alcohol"
for "intoxicating liquor" throughout the
section; combined former subsecs. (a) and (c)
as subsec. (a); inserted subsec. (c); and made
a minor change in phraseology.
The 1979 amendment inserted subsec. (e);
and redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f).
The 1981 amendment substituted "negligent manner" in subsec. (d) for "reckless or
negligent manner or with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or safety"; added
the second sentence to subsec. (d); and made
minor changes in phraseology and style.
Cross-References.
Assessment in addition to fine upon conviction, use for drinking driver rehabilitation
program, 63-43-9 to 63-43-11.
Assessments to fund intoxicated driver
rehabilitation account, 63-43-10.
Automobile homicide, 76-5-207.
Department of health to issue permits for
drawing of blood, 26-1-30(19).
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influence, 73-18-12.

Constitutionality.
It is within the prerogative of the legislature to make it unlawful for one to drive a
vehicle while under the influence of liquor
and to provide a greater penalty if, while
doing so, he injures another by recklessness
or negligence. State v. Brennan (1962) 13 U
2d 195, 371 P 2d 27.
This section does not deal with two separate subjects and thus transgress Const.,
Art. 1, § 12 which requires that legislative
acts must contain only one subject. State v.
Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d 195, 371 P 2d 27.
Actual physical control.
Defendant who was asleep in automobile,
completely off traveled portion of highway
with engine shut off, was not in "actual
physical control" of the vehicle. State v.
Bugger (1971) 25 U 2d 404, 483 P 2d 442.
Blood-alcohol test.
Where officer testified that he obtained the
defendant's consent to the taking of a bloodalcohol test, which fact was also attested by
the nurse and by the physician who took the
blood sample, the evidence left no doubt that
defendant gave his consent to such a test.
State v. Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d
539.
After an accused has been lawfully placed
under arrest it is the duty of the officers to
make a search for evidence relative to the
commission of the crime. The blood-alcohol
test is designed for that purpose. State v.
Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539.
Breathalyzer test reading of .27 is sufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court
that defendant operated his vehicle in a
willful and wanton disregard for the safety
of others. Ellefsen v. Robert (1974) 526 P 2d
912.
Conflict between state and city authorities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt
Lake City v. Kusse (1938) 97 U 113, 93 P 2d
671.
If city ordinance prescribes the punishment for drunken driving as confinement in
city jail, court or judge is without authority
to order confinement in county jail. Ex parte
Folck (1942) 102 U 470, 132 P 2d 130.
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Where evidence is conflicting, it is for the
jury to say whether defendant was guilty of
driving a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. State v. Stewart (1946)
110 U 203, 171 P 2d 383.
Conviction of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter as the result of a collision
between an automobile, which defendant was
driving, and a pedestrian was upheld, where
evidence showed that he had imbibed to such
a degree that it was apparent to all who saw
and heard him that his locomotion and his
power of speech were markedly affected, and
it appeared that such criminal negligence
contributed to the death. A person who
drives a car while in such a condition is reckless and evinces a marked disregard for the
safety of others and is therefore guilty of
criminal negligence. State v. Capps (1947) 111
U 189, 176 P 2d 873.
Conflict between state and municipal
regulation.
Municipal ordinance prohibiting driving
under the influence of alcohol was enforceable where, although not as extensive as the
provisions of the state statute, it did not conflict with the state statute. Layton City v.
Glines (1980) 616 P 2d 588.
Delay in arrest.
Where law enforcement officers on arriving
at scene of automobile collision found injured
defendant sitting on curb and took him to a
nearby hospital for treatment of his wounds
before making arrest, the delay in the arrest
was not unreasonable. State v. Bryan (1964)
16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539.
Double jeopardy.
In a prosecution for violating this section,
although court erred in refusing state's
request to submit case to jury on included
offense of drunken driving, double jeopardy
did not permit further proceedings against
defendant. State v. Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d
195,371 P 2d 27.
Included offense.
Subsection (a) of this section prohibits the
driving of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of liquor as a separate offense, with
a separate punishment as a misdemeanor as
set forth in subsec. (d); and it is necessarily
included in the greater offense of driving
while intoxicated and injuring another in a
reckless or negligent manner, which is punishable as an indictable misdemeanor. State
v. Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d 195, 371 P 2d 27.
Defendant could be prosecuted under this
section even though he had pleaded guilty to
driving without a license, without a registra-

41-6-44.

tion certificate, and without a safety sticker,
since each citation charged a separate offense
entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v.
Johnson (1980) 606 P 2d 253.
Jury trial.
Defendants charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor
with maximum possible imprisonment of six
months, had no federally protected right to
jury trial, and therefore could claim no right
to six-member panel as opposed to fourmember juries which convicted them. State
v. Nuttall (1980) 611 P 2d 722.
Presumptions of intoxication.
In cases arising before the enactment of
41-6-44.5, if state is unable to produce test
results sufficient to permit a presumption of
intoxication when the test was given, it must
provide expert testimony to extrapolate the
results back to the time of the incident to
show defendant's blood alcohol level was sufficient at that time to give rise to the presumption before state is entitled to rely on
the presumption at trial. State v. Bradley
(1978) 578 P 2d 1267.
Procedure to be followed where prior convictions alleged.
As a guide for future cases, where there is
an allegation of prior crimes or prior convictions, the Supreme Court has outlined the
procedure to be followed in the trial courts,
which will properly expedite the adjudication
of such cases, while at the same time safeguarding the substantial rights of accused
persons, and prevent an accused person from
being advertised to the jury as one who
previously perpetrated a similar type of
offense. State v. Stewart (1946) 110 U 203, 171
P 2d 383, setting out the procedure at length,
following Connecticut cases.
Proof of prior convictions.
Upon trial of information for drunken
driving, introduction of evidence of prior convictions before a determination of the issue
on the substantive charge, even if erroneous,
would not warrant directing an acquittal,
and evidence of prior conviction is admissible, even though conviction followed plea of
guilty, and may be shown under proper
procedure. But until a verdict has been
rendered on the principal issue, there is no
occasion to mention prior convictions, since
previous offenses would not be competent to
prove that defendant committed the offense
for which he is then on trial. State v. Stewart
(1946) 110 U 203, 171 P 2d 383, pointing out
manner of showing prior convictions from
the records of justice and city courts, not-
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withstanding informality of proceedings in
such courts and lack of judgment book.
Where the defendant is charged with a
prior conviction of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the prior conviction. It was
then the exclusive province of the jury to
determine from the evidence whether the
state had done so. The trial court's comments
on the evidence and his limiting the jury's
deliberation to whether the record of the
prior conviction was authentic was error
prejudicial to defendant. State v. Harris
(1953) 1 U 2d 182, 264 P 2d 284, 39 ALR 2d
553.
Upon information charging defendant with
driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and with commission of prior offense,
where the docket of the justice of the peace
was received in evidence, the page identified
and the verity of the entry stipulated to in
open court as being in the handwriting of the
justice, the entry, under 78-5-16, became
prima facie evidence of the facts so stated,
and no evidence to the contrary having been
offered, must be presumed to be correct and
sustains the court's finding of guilt of prior
conviction. State v. Bailey (1955) 3 U 2d 254,
282 P 2d 339.
Proof to sustain conviction.
Under former subsec. (a) "operating an
automobile on a public street or highway by
one under the influence of intoxicating liquor
is itself an unlawful act and an offense." But
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter
will be reversed unless the charge is sufficiently proven. State v. Johnson (1930) 76 U
84, 88, 287 P 909, overruled on other grounds
in State v. Crank (1943) 105 U 332, 355, 142 P
2d 178, 188, 170 ALR 542.
Testimony that three or four hours after
accident liquor was detected by odor on
defendant's breath does not prove the charge
of drunken driving, and "driving an automobile in violation of traffic rules or ordinances
in one or more particulars, or driving it
negligently or even recklessly, resulting in an
accident, does not relevantly tend to prove
that the driver was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor." State v. Johnson (1930)
76 U 84, 88, 287 P 909, overruled on other
grounds in State v. Crank (1943) 105 U 332,
355, 142 P 2d 178, 188, 170 ALR 542.
Public intoxication.
Following an automobile collision defendant was sitting on curb holding a
handkerchief to his head which was bleeding;
there was a strong odor of alcohol on his

breath; he appeared to be intoxicated, and
stated that he was drunk. A bottle containing
whiskey was found on the floor of his automobile. He was taken to a nearby hospital
where his wounds were attended and he was
placed under arrest under this section for
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Under such circumstances arrest of defendant was justified though offense for which
he was arrested was not committed in the
presence of the arresting officer, the defendant being intoxicated in a public place in
violation of 32-7-13, and upon death of his
passengers, he was charged with automobile
homicide under former 76-30-7.4. State v.
Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539.
Venue.
Where the testimony adequately established where the offense was committed, the
court will take judicial notice that that point
is in the county so that the venue has been
sufficiently established. State v. Bailey (1955)
3 U 2d 254,282 P 2d 339.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ,s:;, 332.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles § 628.
7A AmJur 2d 478.-498, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 296-311.
Admissibility and weight of evidence based
on scientific test for intoxication or presence
of alcohol in system, 127 ALR 1513, 159 ALR
209.
.
Admissibility, in vehicle accident case, of
evidence of opposing party's intoxication
where litigant's pleading failed to allege such
fact, 26 ALR 2d 359.
Admissibility of hospital record relating to
intoxication or sobriety of patient, 38 ALR 2d
778.
Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle
on private property, of legislation making
drunken driving a criminal offense, 29 ALR
3d 938.
Constitutionality
and effect of statute
relating to civil liability of person driving
automobile while under influence of liquor, 56
ALR 327.
Degree or nature of intoxication for purposes of statute or ordinance making it a
criminal offense to operate an automobile
while in that condition, 142 ALR 555.
Driving automobile while intoxicated as a
substantive criminal offense, 42 ALR 1498,49
ALR 1392, 68 ALR 1356, 142 ALR 555.
Drugs, driving under the influence, or when
addicted to use of as criminal offense, 17
ALR 3d815.
Intoxication from specified percentages of
alcohol present in system, construction and
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application of statutes creating presumption
or other inference, 16 ALR 3d 748.
What constitutes driving, being in control
of, or operating a motor vehicle within statute making such act, while intoxicated, an
offense, 47 ALR 2d 570.
What constitutes driving, operating, or
being in control of motor vehicle for purposes

41-6-44.3

of driving while intoxicated statute or ordinance, 93 ALR 3d 7.
What is "motor vehicle" within statutes
making it offense to drive while intoxicated,
66 ALR 2d 1146.
Law Reviews.
Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, 1980 Utah
L. Rev.155.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Blood-alcohol test.
Presumption of intoxication arising from
presence of 0.08% alcohol in blood was
inapplicable to automobile homicide prosecution under former statute, and instructing
of jury on presumption was reversible error.
State v. Risk (1974) 520 P 2d 215.
Proof of intoxication.
In a prosecution for automobile homicide
where there was competent, substantial,

expert testimony that defendant's alcoholblood content was not only 0.15, but 0.224,
which would impair motor and sensory reactions, an instruction by the court that 0.15
alcohol-blood content raised a presumption
that one would be under the influence was
not prejudicial. State v. Romero (1961) 12 U
2d 210, 364 P 2d 828.

41-6-44.2. Driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or higher
unlawful - Penalty. (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
subsection (b) of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content
of .10% or greater, by weight, to drive or be in actual physical control of
any vehicle within this state.
(b) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than
six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by
both.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.2, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 80, § 2.

and providing drivers license revocation.
Laws 1973, ch. 80.

Title of Act.
An act amending section 41-2-18, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
69, Laws of Utah 1955, and enacting section
41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor; providing a misdemeanor classification for anyone driving a vehicle when
their blood alcohol content is .10% or higher;

Cross-References.
Revocation of license, 41-2-18.
Constitutionality.
This statute states with sufficient clarity
and conciseness the two elements necessary
to constitute its violation; a blood alcohol
concentration of .10%, and concurrent operation or actual physical control of any vehicle.
Greaves v. State (1974) 528 P 2d 805.

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath
including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that
a person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10%
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or greater, documents offerred as memoranda or records of acts, conditions
or events to prove that the analysis and accuracy of the instrument were
made pursuant to standards established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection
(1) and the provisions of subsection (2) have been met, there shall be a
presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
History: C. 1943, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 2.
Title of Act.

An act amending section 41-6-44, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
75, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended
by chapter 268, Laws of Utah 1977, repealing
and reenacting section 41-6-44.5, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 270,
Laws of Utah 1977, and enacting section
41-6-44.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to motor vehicles; providing for manda-

tory jail sentences for persons convicted of
having two or more convictions for driving
under the influence of alcohol; providing for
the establishment of guidelines for chemical
analysis of accused's breath; providing presumption of accuracy for test; and expanding
admissibility of such evidence. - Laws 1979,
ch. 243.
Collateral References.

Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests
of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed
methods, 96 ALR 3d 745.

41-6-44.5. Driving while intoxicated - Chemical tests as evidence
- Presumption of blood alcohol level. (1) In any action or proceeding
in which it is material to prove that a person was driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with
a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater, the results of a chemical test
or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10shall be admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed
to be not less than the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood
by the chemical test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the
alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged
driving or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine
what weight shall be given to the result of the test.
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed as
limiting the consideration or application by the trier of fact of the presumptions set forth in section 41-6-44, nor shall they prevent a court from
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receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol
level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical control.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L.
1979,ch. 243, § 3.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1979, ch. 243, § 3 repealed old section
41-6-44.5 (L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1), relating to

chemical tests as evidence and the presumption of blood alcohol level, and enacted new
section 41-6-44.5.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Relation back of test results.
Results of chemical analysis test were not
required to be extrapolated back to the time

of the incident by expert testimony to be
admissible as evidence. State v. Bradley
(1978) 578 P 2d 1267.

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug Refusal to allow - Warning, report, revocation of license - Court
action on revocation - Person incapable of refusal - Results of test
available - Who may give test - Evidence. (a) Any person operating
a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose
of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe such
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug. A ~~~ce officer shall determine which of .the af ores~id te_ets
shall be administerei ---- "Fo-person, ·wno
lias'bee:ru~~ested pursuant to t~!S section to submit
to a chem_icalt~si;_o.r_tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the
right to select the test or tests to be administered. The failure-or inabfiity
or :rpe::ree officer to-·arraiige for any specific test shall not be a defense
to taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to
submit to the requested test or tests.
(b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to submit
to such chemical test or tests, such person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests
can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following
this warning, unless such person immediately requests the chemical test
or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test shall be given
and a peace officer shall submit a sworn report that he had grounds to
believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug
or combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had refused
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to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (a) of this
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a-peace officer
to the effect that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the
department shall notify such person of a hearing before the department.
If at said hearing the department determines that the person was granted
the right to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department
as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his
license or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by
the department under the provisions of this section shall have the right
to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in
the district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such
court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the
matter for trial de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department
and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case
and to determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation
under the provisions of this act.
(c) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in
subsection (a) of this section, and the test or tests may be administered
whether such person has been arrested or not.
(d) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such
test or tests shall be made available to him.
(e) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine
or breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or
person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of
a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test
is administered according to standard medical practice.
(f) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician
of his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or
tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such additional test shall not affect admissability of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, nor
preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace
officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical
test or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult
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an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney,
physician or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or
tests under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10,enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 43.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1981, ch. 126, § 43 repealed old
section 41-6-44.10 (L. 1957, ch. 80, § (1]; 1959,
ch. 65, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3;
1977, ch. 268, § 4), relating to implied consent
to tests, and enacted new section 41-6-44.10.
Cross-References.
Chemical tests as evidence of intoxication,
41-6-44.5.
Department of health to issue permits for
drawing of blood, 26-1-30(19).
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influence, 73-18-12.
Constitutionality - standing to raise.
Motorist who submitted to blood-alcohol
test and was convicted of driving while intoxicated had no standing to challenge constitutionality of this section, not having been convicted under or by reason of it. Salt Lake
City v. Perkins (1959) 9 U 2d 317, 343 P 2d
1106.

Administration of test.
An officer administering a breathalyzer
test under this section can require an
arrested person to furnish what the officer
reasonably believes to be a viable sample,
and the "green light" that is activated when
55 c.c's of breath have been acquired is
merely an aid in making that determination.
Powell v. Cox (1980) 608 P 2d 239.
Choice of tests.
The 1959 amendment to this section did
not change the section so as to alter the
court's interpretation
that the choice of
chemical tests is to be made by the driver
and not by the officer and, where an officer
failed to give the driver his choice of tests, he
failed to comply with the statute and revocation of the driver's license under the implied
consent law was invalid. Bean v. State,
Department of Public Safety (1961) 12 U 2d
76, 362 P 2d 750.

Civil nature of statute.
Implied consent provisions are obviously
civil in nature, as opposed to criminal, since
they are devoid of criminal sanctions and
provide only for revocation of the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle, and since administrative hearing may be had subsequent to the
test followed by trial de novo. Cavaness v.
Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349.
Conditional consent.
Defendant had no right to impose any conditions as a prerequisite to giving consent,
and demanding any unreasonable or impractical conditions as a prerequisite was a
refusal to give consent. Moran v. Shaw (1978)
580 P 2d 241.
Evidence.
Where defendant was injured in an automobile accident and taken to a hospital
where a physician directed a medical
technologist to draw a blood sample for
cross-matching, and a police officer directed
the taking of a sample for a blood alcohol
test, the results of which showed a blood
alcohol level of .13%, results of the test were
properly admitted into evidence at defendant's
subsequent
prosecution
under
76-5-207(1) for automobile homicide, because
the test was done at the direction and under
the supervision of defendant's doctor. State
v. Durrant (1977) 561 P 2d 1056, implying disapproval of Gibb v. Dorius (1975) 533 P 2d
299.

Grounds of peace officer requesting test.
Due process requires that peace officer
must have reasonable grounds for his belief
that the person requested to submit to the
chemical test was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs; reasonable
grounds exist where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of
which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the situation exists. Ballard v.
State, Motor Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d
1302.
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Miranda warning.
Rights explained in a Miranda warning to
remain silent and to consult an attorney do
not apply to the decision to take a chemical
test; it is incumbent on the arresting officer
to explain this unequivocally to the motorist,
and questions of whether he did so explain it
and whether the motorist was confused and
manifested his confusion to the arresting
officer are for the trier of fact to determine.
Holman v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 1331; Muir v.
Cox (1980) 611 P 2d 384.
Since license revocation proceeding was
not a criminal proceeding, fact that officer
who arrested
motorist
and requested
him to
take breathalyzer
test
did not give him
Miranda warning did not render officer's
testimony inadmissible in the revocation proceeding. Smith v. Cox (1980) 609 P 2d 1332.
Prerequisites

for admission

into evidence.

Chemical test could not be taken without
driver's consent prior to his arrest, so that
district court erred in admitting results of
test in prosecution for automobile homicide
where defendant had objected to taking of
blood sample and was not, at time blood
sample was extracted, under arrest. State v.
Cruz (1968) 21 U 2d 406, 446 P 2d 307.
Presence of counsel.
Person had no right to presence of counsel
during taking of, or as condition of taking,
any test. Cavaness v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349;
Holman v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 1331.
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to
submit to test.
Acquittal of the defendant under the criminal charge of driving under the influence is
not a bar to revocation of the driver's license
for failure to submit to a chemical test when
requested to do so. Ballard v. State, Motor
Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d 1302.
At a proceeding
for failure

to revoke a driver•s license
to a chemical
test when

to submit

so requested, driver is entitled to procedural
due process, although not to the same
protections afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution, is not required to post bond
nor appear at the administrative hearing,
cannot be fined or imprisoned either for his
refusal to submit to a test or for his failure
to appear at the hearing, and if he fails to
appear or it is determined at the hearing
that he was granted the right to submit to a
chemical test and refused, the department's
authority is limited to revocation of the
driver's license for one year. Ballard v. State

Motor
Vehicle
Division
(1979)595P 2d1302.'
The purpose of the administrative proceeding to revoke a driver's license for failure to

submit to a chemical test is to protect the
public, not to punish drunken drivers; such
drivers are subject to separate criminal
prosecution for purposes of punishment.
Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Division
(1979) 595 P 2d 1302.
The rule that the corpus delicti of the
crime must be established by evidence independent of the accused's confession is not
applicable to a proceeding to revoke a
driver's license for failure to submit to a
chemical test since such proceeding is not
criminal in nature. Ballard v. State, Motor
Vehicle

Division

Reasonable

(1979) 595 P 2d 1302.

refusal.

This section as amended in 1977 precludes
the defense of "reasonable refusal" as was
contemplated by prior cases and now provides for a simple "yes" or "no" to the
officer's request to take a test. Cavaness v.
Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349.
Refusal to submit to test.
Express verbal refusal is not necessary to
withdraw the consent implied by the statute,
which is only a fictional consent anyway; a
refusal in fact, regardless of the words that
accompany it, can be as convincing as an
express verbal refusal, and that includes
playing verbal games with the officer to avoid
a direct refusal. Beck v. Cox (1979) 597 P 2d
1335.

Revocation of license was supported by
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence that driver gave an explicit verbal
refusal to take chemical test after being
properly warned. Miles v. Cox (1979) 597 P 2d
1344.

Motorist's refusal to take blood test until
he could call his lawyer constituted refusal
under the statute and a valid basis for revocation of his· license.
611 P2d. 882.

Fjelsted

v. Cox

(1980)

Trial de novo in district court.
The trial de novo in the district court to
review an administrative revocation of a
driver's license for refusal to submit to a
blood test for alcohol content pursuant to the
implied consent statute is a complete retrial
upon new evidence with the burden of proof
and the burden of going forward with the
evidence upon the drivers license division.
Pledger v. Cox (1981) 626 P 2d 415.
Collateral References,

Construction
and application of statutes
creating presumption or other inference of
intoxication from specified percentages of
alcohol present in system, 16 ALR 3d 748.
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Duty of law enforcement officer to offer
suspect chemical sobriety test under implied
consent law, 95 ALR 3d 710.
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests
of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed
methods, 96 ALR 3d 745.
Request before submitting to chemical
sobriety test to communicate with counsel as
refusal to take test, 97 ALR 3d 852.

41-6-44.10

Request for prior administration of additional test as constituting refusal to submit
to chemical sobriety test under implied consent law, 98 ALR 3d 572.
Law Reviews.

The Status of Implied Consent Legislation
Since Schmerber v. California, 1967 Utah L.
Rev.168.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and application.

A person is deemed to give his consent to a
chemical test of some one of the designated
substances, breath, blood, urine, or saliva,
but not all of them; and where a motorist,
arrested by an officer on the suspicion of
being intoxicated, was advised that he must
submit to a blood test or his license would be
revoked, it was not in accordance with the
statute and there was no proper basis for
revoking his license. Ringwood v. State (1959)
8 U 2d 287, 333 P 2d 943.
Evidence.

Prior to the enactment of this section it
was held, in an action against the estate of a
deceased for injuries arising out of an automobile accident, that the testimony of a
doctor who made a blood test from blood
taken from the deceased's body without the
consent of the deceased's parents was admissible in evidence. Fretz v. Anderson (1956) 5
U 2d 290, 300 P 2d 642.
Refusal to submit to test.

Where arrested motorist did not take a
test because of his having taken time to
reach his attorney and make up his mind
whether to submit, he had not "refused a
chemical test" and order revoking his
driver's license was not authorized. Hunter v.
Dorius (1969) 23 U 2d 122, 458 P 2d 877.
Driver arrested for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, advised of
this law and of his constitutional rights, but
pretends not to understand, refuses to take
breathalyzer test, and presents no reasonable
cause for refusing to submit; has his driver's
license properly revoked as required by law.
McCall v. Dorius (1974) 527 P 2d 647.
The question of revocation of plaintiff's
driver's license for refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test was rendered moot by the
failure of the state to provide a "duly authorized laboratory technician"; drawing blood
for the test constitutes the practice of medicine and a technician performing the test is
not duly authorized unless acting under the
supervision or direction of a medical practi-

tioner. Gibb v. Dorius (1975) 533 P 2d 299,
distinguished in 561 P 2d 1056.
Where, upon arrest for driving while intoxicated, officer asked defendant whether he
would submit to a "chemical test," and
defendant replied that he would take a blood
test and that he wanted his physician
present, to both of which requests the officer
agreed, subsequent failure to take blood test
due to unavailability of physician and defendant's refusal to submit to breathalyzer test
administered by arresting officer did not justify revocation of defendant's
license.
Gassman v. Dorius (1975) 543 P 2d 197.
Plaintiff who, upon being arrested for driving while intoxicated, agreed in principle to
submit to the test required by this section,
but at police station refused to take it until
her attorney was present, did not refuse to
submit within the meaning of the statute
where it appeared that she called her attorney and he made a bona fide effort to appear
within a reasonable time, but the police officer grew tired of waiting and left without
administering the test; therefore, driver
license division was not justified in revoking
plaintiff's license to drive. Peterson v. Dorius
(1976) 547 P 2d 693.
Where plaintiff, immediately upon being
arrested after she was involved in an accident, and while still agitated and upset, was
informed of the provisions of the implied
consent law and replied that the police officers did not know what they were talking
about, she did not expressly refuse to take
the test required by this section, and the
subsequent suspension of her driver's license
on that ground was error. Hyde v. Dorius
(1976) 549 P 2d 451.
Police officers need not follow exactly the
sequence of events set out in this section;
language of statute indicating that notification of consequences should be given after
refusal to submit to test did not impose
requirement that officer proceed in exactly
that fashion, and officer's notification to
defendant of consequences of refusal prior to
obtaining his answer as to whether he would
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submit did not constitute noncompliance
with the statute. Elliott v. Dorius (1976) 557
P 2d 759, distinguishing 543 P 2d 197.
The fact that defendant believed the
breath test to be unreliable, and therefore

refused to submit to it, did not constitute
"reasonable cause" for refusal within the
contemplation of the statute. Elliott v.
Dorius (1976) 557 P 2d 759.

41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in
motor vehicle prohibited - Definitions - Exceptions - Penalty for
violation. (1) No person shall drink any alcoholic beverage while driving
a motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any street or highway.
(2) No person shall keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any public street or highway, any container
whatsoever which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been
opened, the seal thereon broken, or the contents of the container partially
consumed.
(3) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally
occupied by the driver and his passengers and includes areas accessible to
them while traveling such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the
vehicle not accessible to the driver or passengers while inside the vehicle;
and
(b) "Alcoholic beverage" shall have the meaning provided in section
32-1-3.

(4) The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall not apply to passengers in the living quarters of a motor home or camper, but the driver of
the vehicle will be prohibited from consuming alcoholic beverages as provided in subsection (1).
(5) The provisions of subsection (2) shall not apply to passengers
traveling in any duly licensed taxicab or bus.
(6) Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.20,enacted by L.
1981, ch. 272, § 1.

This act enacts section 41-6-44.20, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1981, ch. 272.

Title of Act.
An act relating to motor vehicles; prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages in
motor vehicles; prohibiting open containers
of alcoholic beverages in passenger areas of
motor vehicles; and providing exceptions and
penalties.

Collateral References.
7A AmJur 2d 498, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 311.
Validity of statute or ordinance making it
an offense to consume or have alcoholic beverages in open package in motor vehicle, 57
ALR 3d 1071.

41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. (1) Any person who drives any
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property
is guilty of reckless driving.
348
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(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943,
57-7-112;L. 1978,ch. 33, § 9.
Compiler's Notes.

The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a conviction under this section subsequent to a
conviction under an ordinance as provided in
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent conviction" near the beginning of the second sentence of subsec. (2); substituted "$299" for
"$1,000" near the end of subsec. (2); deleted
the last two sentences of subsec. (2) which
provided that second violation had to occur
within three years of the preceding violation
and for suspension of license by department;
and made minor changes in phraseology and
style.
Former jeopardy.

Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558,
reviewed in State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U
63, 157 P 2d 258.
Collateral References.

Automobiles ~ 330.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 609-624.
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq.,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312 et
seq.

"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius
of lights" application of doctrine to accident
involving pedestrian crossing street or highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424.
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 ALR 883.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99
ALR 756.
Liability of one fleeing police for injury
resulting from collision of police vehicle with
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d
1226.
"Residence district," "business district,"
"school area," and the like, in statutes and
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343.
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; definiteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286.
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding
running of automobile so as to inflict damage
or injury, 47 ALR 255.
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR
1273,52 ALR 2d 1337.
When automobile is under control, 28 ALR
952.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
Section
41-6-46.

Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and
curves - Prima facie speed limits - Emergency power of the governor.
41-6-47. Prima facie limit.
41-6-48. Speed Restrictions - Powers of local authorities.
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges - Prima facie evidence.
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway - Barricade or obstruction therefor.
41-6-52. Violation - Pleading.
41-6-52.1. Repealed.

41-6-46. Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and curves - Prima facie speed limits - Emergency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a
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speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing,
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest,
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) Twenty miles per hour.
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods.
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district.
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48.
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may
change the speed on the highways of the state.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed old
section 41-6-46 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943,
57-7-113; L. 1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § 1;
1959, ch. 66, § 1; 1978, ch. 34, § 1), relating to
speed regulations, and enacted new section
41-6-46.
Title of Act.
An act repealing and re-enacting section
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957,
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of
Utah 1978, and section 41-2-19, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter
34, Laws of Utah 1978; relating to highway
speeds and points for certain speeding
offenses; providing for maximum speeds; providing for suspensions of licenses for certain
offenses; providing for the assessment of
points for certain violations and the basis for
and effect of such points; providing for new
licensure after suspension; and providing for
hearings and re-examinations. - Laws 1978
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9.

Cross-References.
Municipal regulations, 10-8-30.
Reckless driving, 41-6-45.
Construction and application.
This section requires that driver shall not
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent in view of existing conditions and
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful
manner, and that speed shall be appropriately reduced when special hazards exist
with respect to other traffic or by reason of
weather conditions. Horsley v. Robinson
(1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592.
Constitutionality.
A former speed law was held constitutional
as against contention that it violated Const.
Art. VI, § 23. State v. Brown (1928) 75 U 37,
282 P 785.
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist charged with
speeding under this section does not bar
subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63, ·
157 P 2d 258.
Instructions.
In action arising out of car-pedestrian accident in California, evidence did not justify
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instruction that defendant had duty to drive
car in conformity with California statute
providing that no person shall drive vehicle
at speed greater than is reasonable and prudent, where there was no evidence that
defendant's speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour
was excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's
Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.) Hunter v. Michaelis
(1948)114 U 242, 198 P 2d 245.
Where defendant failed to see small child
in the street until it was too late to avoid
striking him, the trial court should have
instructed jury that driver is charged with
duty of seeing what he would have seen had
he been exercising reasonable care, since evidence showed motorist should have seen the
child much sooner; instructing jury on right
to assume others will perform their legal
duties and on sudden or unexpected situation
arising without fault on defendant's part was
reversible error. Solt v. Godfrey (1971) 25 U
2d 210, 479 P 2d 474.
Motor carriers and buses.
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle
within such rate of speed as reasonably prudent person would operate under existing
conditions, and, where road and weather conditions make driving hazardous, reasonable
prudence requires proportionate increase in
care of driver to avoid injury to passengers.
Horsley v. Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P
2d592.
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and
50 miles per hour under very hazardous conditions on outside lane of main highway
which was covered with ice and slush, collided with automobile approaching from
opposite direction which went out of control
and skidded into path of bus, and distance
between bus and automobile, when it first
became discernible that latter was out of
control, was between 30 and 3,30 feet, evidence was sufficient to sustain verdict in
favor of injured bus passenger for hire as
against bus company, in that jury could conclude therefrom that bus driver was negligent in operating bus at excessive rate of
speed under such circumstances, which was
proximate cause of collision. Horsley v.
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592.
Negligence.
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a
motor vehicle within the speed limit prescribed by statute or ordinance, although a
jury may say in some instances, dependent
upon the particular attendant facts and circumstances, that the operation of an automobile within prescribed limit is nevertheless
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negligence. Lochhead v. Jensen (1912) 42 U
99, 129 P 347.
Violation of speed regulations may constitute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light
& Railway Co. (1913) 42 U 415, 132 P 8.
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the
lawful maximum speed may constitute negligence under given circumstances. Fowkes v.
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1915) 46 U
502, 151 P 53.
It has long been the rule in this state that
it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an
automobile upon a traveled public highway
at such rate of speed that said automobile
cannot be stopped within distance at which
opera tor of said car is able to see objects
upon highway in front of him. Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co. (1932) 80 U 331,
15 P 2d 309.
When a driver upon a public highway with
his light equipment cannot see more than 50
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at
such speed as will enable him to stop within
that distance. Hansen v. Clyde (1936) 89 U 31,
56 P 2d 1366, 104 ALR 943.
For general discussion as to speed and civil
liability with respect thereto, see opinions by
Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v.
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592.
Where fog was so great that visibility was
limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed
under those conditions was about five miles
per hour, the court cannot say as a matter of
law that the plaintiff was not negligent in
operating his car at the rate of 25 miles per
hour. Shields v. Ramon (1952) 122 U 474, 251
P 2d 671.
What is a reasonable and prudent speed
under the conditions and having regard to
the actual and potential hazards then existing is a matter about which there is room for
reasonable disagreement and such being the
case, a jury question is presented. Lodder v.
Western Pac. R. Co. {1953) 123 U 316, 259 P
2d 589.
Driving in excess of speed limit may constitute prima facie evidence of negligence,
but does not constitute conclusive evidence.
Cardon v. Brenchley (1978) 575 P 2d 184.
Pleadings and proceedings.
If the complaint is fatally defective in its
allegations when viewed as an attempt to
bring defendant within the provisions of this
section, judgment for plaintiff will be
reversed. Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal
Co. (1936) 90 U 578, 63 P 2d 267.
Questions of law and fact.
Whether the speed at which the vehicle
was going at the time was the proximate
cause of the accident is a question of fact.
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Sweet v. Salt Lake City (1913) 43 U 306, 134 P
1167.
In action arising out of intersection collision, evidence sufficiently established prima
facie case of negligence on part of defendant
in failing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at excessive rate of speed, and contributory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478, 189 P 2d 127.
In action against motorist for death of
decedent, who was killed while hitching
small tractor to rear of an automobile, it was
a question of fact for the jury whether
motorist was negligent in failing to reduce
her speed below 50 miles per hour when she
saw wrecker ahead of her on the highway.
Taylor v. Johnson (1964) 15 U 2d 342, 393 P
2d 382.
Collateral References.
Automobiles P 331.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650.
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq.
Application of "assured clear distance
ahead" or "radius of lights" doctrine to accident involving pedestrian crossing street or
highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424.
"Assured clear distance" statute or rule as
applied at hill or curve, 133 ALR 967.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony
based on sound alone as to speed of motor
vehicle involved in accident, 33 ALR 3d 1405.
Conflict between statutes and local regulations as to speed, 21 ALR 1187, 64 ALR 994,
147 ALR529.
Criminal or penal responsibility of public
officer or employee for violating speed regulations, 9 ALR 367.
Driving at illegal speed as reckless driving
within statute making reckless driving a

criminal offense, 86 ALR 1281, 52 ALR 2d
1337.
Driving automobile at a speed which prevents stopping within length of vision as
negligence, 44 ALR 1403, 58 ALR 1493, 87
ALR 900, 97 ALR 546.
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 ALR 883.
Expert opinion evidence of speed not based
upon view of vehicle, 156 ALR 382.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99
ALR 756.
Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity, 6 ALR 3d 1326.
Indictment or information which charges
offense as to speed in language of statute, 115
ALR357.
Liability of public authority for injury
arising out of automobile race conducted on
street or highway, 80 ALR 3d 1192.
Meaning of "residence district," "business
district," "school area," and the like, in statutes and ordinances · regulating speed of
motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343.
Opinion testimony as to speed of motor
vehicle based on skid marks and other facts,
29 ALR 3d 248.
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or
electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations, 47 ALR 3d 822.
Public officers or employees as bound by
speed regulations, 19 ALR 459, 23 ALR 418.
Speeding prosecution based on observation
from aircraft, 23 ALR 3d 1446.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286.
Violation of speed law as affecting
violator's right to recover for negligence, 12
ALR463.
Violation of speed regulations as affecting
rights to recover for injuries due to collision
with streetcar, 28 ALR 228, 46 ALR 1008.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
National emergency.
"National emergency" as used in former
provision authorizing governor to change
speed limit by proclamation meant an
unforeseen combination of circumstances
calling for immediate action by national
leaders and support from citizens for the
safety, peace, health and general welfare of
the nation; the 1973 Arab oil embargo was
such an emergency and governor could
validly reduce state-wide speed limit to 55

miles per hour by proclamation. State v.
Foukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312.
Validly issued proclamation by governor
setting speed limit could be terminated by
governor's proclamation,
by legislative
action, or by judicial holding that the -circumstances had so changed that the proclamation could no longer serve any useful purpose; governor's proclamation limiting speed
limit to 55 miles per hour had not been
terminated as of December 2, 1976. In re
Prisbrey (1978) 576 P 2d 1278.
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41-6-47. Prima facie limit. Whenever the department of transportation shall determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any prima facie speed hereinbefore set forth is greater or less
than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a state highway, said department
of transportation may determine and declare a reasonable and safe prima
facie speed limit thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs
giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or other place or part
of the highway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 37; C. 1943,
57-7-114; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 13.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment inserted "state"
before "highway."
The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for references to the
state road commission in two places.
State-wide speed reduction.
State road commission had no authority

under this section to pass ordinanc,i reducing
state-wide speed limit to 55 miles per hour in
response to President's request without engineering or traffic investigation or finding that
prior limit was unreasonable or unsafe. State
v. Foukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <S=;:>331.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 641-650.
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq.

41-6-48. Speed Restrictions
Powers of local authorities.
(1) Whenever local authorities in their respective jurisdiction determine
on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the prima facie
speed permitted under this article is greater or less than is reasonable and
safe under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or part of a highway, the local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and safe
prima facie limit thereon which:
(a) Decreases the limit at intersections; or
(b) Increases the limit within an urban district; or
(c) Decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than
35 miles per hour.
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by
an engineering and traffic investigation the proper prima facie speed for
all arterial streets and shall declare a reasonable and safe prima f acie
limit thereon which may be greater or less than the prima facie speed permitted under this chapter for an urban district.
(3) Any altered limit established as herein above authorized shall be
effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected upon
such street or highway.
(4) The department of transportation shall have exclusive authority to
determine and declare prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state highways whether such highways be within or without the corporate limits of
any city.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-48, enacted by L.
1975,ch. 207, § 13; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 10.

Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 14 repealed old
section 41-6-48 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 38; C. 1943,
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57-7-115; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1951 (1st S.S.),
ch. 12, § 1; 1957, ch. 77, § 1; 1973, ch. 81, § 3),
relating to speed restrictions and powers of
local authorities, and enacted new section
41-6-48.
The 1978 amendment deleted "in conformance to the current approved 'Utah Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices"' at the
end of subsec. (3); deleted former subsecs. (d)
and (e) which read: "(d) Whenever there is a
drop of ten (10) miles per hour or more in the
posted speed limit, it shall be preceded by a
sign giving advance notice of such a reduction. Such signs shall be as specified in the
current approved 'Utah Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices.' (e) No local authority shall have the authority to modify or
alter the basic rule set forth in subdivision
(a) subsection (2) of section 41-6-46"; substituted "department of transportation" near

the beginning of subsec. (4) for "state road
commission"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and style.
Collateral References.
Automobiles P 168(1).
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 290.
7A AmJur 2d 395, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 219.
Conflict between statutes and local regulations as to automobiles, 21 ALR 1186, 64 ALR
993,147 ALR 522.
Constitutionality of legislative delegation
of powers to prescribe or vary regulations
concerning motor vehicles used on highways,
87 ALR 546.
Traffic regulations, failure of municipality
to adopt or enforce as ground of its liability
for damage to property or person, 92 ALR
1495, 161 ALR 1404.

41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. (a) No person shall drive a
motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for
safe operation or because upon a grade or in compliance with law; provided
that operating a motor vehicle on a controlled-access highway at less than
the lawful maximum speed in a left-lane side by side and at the same speed
as a vehicle operated in the adjacent right-lane shall constitute evidence
of impeding or blocking normal movement of traffic, except when a reduced
speed is necessary because the left-lane is the approach lane of an exit
ramp or because of congested traffic, adverse weather, or in compliance
with official traffic-control devices.
(b) Whenever the department of transportation
or local authorities
within their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway
consistently impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the
department of transportation or such local authority may determine and
shall post a minimum speed limit below which no person shall drive a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.
History:
L. 1941, ch. 52, § 39; C. 1943,
57-7-116; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1967, ch. 89, § 1;
1969, ch. 108, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 14.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment added subsec. (b);
and made a minor change in phraseology.
The 1967 amendment deleted a second
paragraph from subsec. (a) which authorized
police officers to enforce the provision by
directions to drivers and provided that
willful disobedience of the provision or
refusal to comply with direction of an officer
constituted a misdemeanor.

The 1969 amendment added the proviso to
subsec. (a).
The 1979 amendment substituted "controlled-access highway" for "limited-access
highway" in subsec. (a); and substituted
"department of transportation" for references to the state road commission in two
places in subsec. (b).
Cross-References.
Slow-moving vehicle, 41-6-138.
"Utah Horseless
Carriage"
exempt,
41-21-3.
Collateral References.
Automobiles P 324.
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61 CJS Motor Vehicles§ 588.
7A AmJur 2d 401, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 228.

41-6-51

Civil cases involving law against
speed, 66 ALR 2d 1194.

slow

.41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges - Prima facie evidence.
(1) No person shall drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated
structure constituting a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than
the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge
or structure, when such structure is signposted as provided in this section.
(2) The department of transportation
upon request from any local
authority shall, or upon its own initiative, may conduct an investigation
of any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway,
and if it finds that such structure cannot with safety withstand vehicles
traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this chapter, the
department of transportation shall determine and declare the maximum
speed of vehicles which such structure can withstand, and shall cause or
permit suitable signs stating such maximum speed to be erected and maintained before each end of such structure.
(3) Upon the trial of any person charged with a violation of this
section, proof of said determination of the maximum speed by the department of transportation and the existence of said signs shall constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum speed which can be maintained with
safety to such bridge or structure.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 40; C. 1943,
57-7-117;L.1978, ch. 33, § 11.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment substituted references to the department of transportation for
references to the state road commission in
three places; deleted "at a distance of 100

feet" after "maintained" near the end of
subsec. (2); and made minor changes in
phraseology and style.
Collateral References.
Collision between automobiles on bridge or
approach thereto, 118 ALR 1196.

41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway - Barricade or
obstruction therefor. (a) No person shall engage in any motor vehicle
speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway and no person shall aid
or abet in any such motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any highway.
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of facilitating or aiding or as an
incident to any motor vehicle speed contest upon a highway, in any manner
obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in
placing any such barricade or obstruction upon any highway.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-118.10, enacted by
L. 1949,ch. 65, § 1.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <S=o6.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 641(1).

7A AmJur 2d 508, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 323.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes, specifically directed
against racing of automobiles on public
streets or highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d
1286.
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41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. (a) In every charge of violation of any
speed regulation in this act the complaint, also the summons or notice to
appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have
driven, also the prima facie speed applicable within the district or at the
location.
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima facie speed limitations
shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate
cause of an accident.
History:
57-7-119.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 42; C. 1943,

Collateral References.
Automobiles e:,, 351.

61A CJS Motor Vehicles § 588.
7A AmJur 2d 406, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 231.

41-6-52.1. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch. 77, § 2), relating to resume speed road signs, was repealed
by Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 61.

ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING, PASSING
AND OTH&1"!RULES OF THE ROAD
Section
41-6-53.
41-6-54.
41-6-55.
41-6-56.
41-6-57.
41-6-58.
41-6-59.
41-6-60.
41-6-61.
41-6-62.

Duty to drive on right side of highway - Exceptions.
Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.
Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction.
Passing upon right - When permissible.
Limitation on passing.
Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exceptions.
Signs and markings on roadway - No passing zones - Exceptions.
One-way traffic - Signs.
Roadway divided into marked lanes - Rules - Traffic-control devices.
Following another vehicle - Proximity and distance - Caravan or motorcade
- Exception for funeral procession.
41-6-63.
Repealed.
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section - Unlawful
actions of drivers - Dividing section defined and described.
Controlled-access highways - Driving upon and from highways.
41-6-64.
Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or kind of traffic - Traf41-6-65.
fic-control devices.

41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway - Exceptions.
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon
the right half of the roadway, except as follows:
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction under the rules governing such movement;
(2) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left
of the center of the roadway; provided any person so doing shall yield the
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right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway within such distance as to constitute an
immediate hazard;
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under
the rules applicable thereon; or
(4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(b) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal
speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing
shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when
overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road
or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943,
57-7-120;L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 14.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b).
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (a)(2)
which read: "When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair."
Construction and application.
Where this section refers to "half the roadways," the reasonable interpretation of the
meaning of this term is that it means half of
the roadway as it exists at the time it is
being traveled and not half the roadway as it
may have been laid out originally. To this
effect see Dixon v. Alabam Freight Co. (1941)
57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584, in which the Arizona court construed sections similar to ours
as quoted above. Patton v. Kirkman (1946)
109U 487, 167 P 2d 282.
Backing.
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to
right have no application to backing. Naisbitt
v. Eggett (1956) 5 U 2d 5, 295 P 2d 832.
Bicycle and truck.
Driver of autotruck who was on right side
of street and was not on, near to, or
approaching crossing where both vehicles
and pedestrians might pass either or both
ways, had right to relax his vigilance and
was not required to do more than to maintain such lookout as would prevent his colliding or coming in contact with anyone on his
side of street. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co.
(1919)55 U 409, 186 P 439.
Effect of passing from right to center.
While in case street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof,

yet, when motorist or bicyclist passes from
right to left of center of street, he loses some
of his rights, and may not be heard to complain of conduct of those who are on proper
side of street to same extent as though he
also were on proper side. Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439.
Instruction.
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile at intersection, instruction that motorist
had right to presume that every other person
would obey law by traveling on right-hand
side of road, and that no duty rested upon
motorist to stop or change course of automobile until he had reason to believe that plaintiff was traveling on wrong side of street,
was properly refused where it was disputed
question as to whether bicyclist was on
wrong side of roadway. Cheney v. Buck (1920)
56 U 29, 189 P 81.
Where collision takes place upon street
having four traffic lanes, it is proper to
instruct as to duty of defendant to use right
traffic lane, and as to duty of the respective
parties to use lane 4 rather than lane 3,
where the evidence warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadleir (1945) 108 U 552, 162
P 2d 112, setting out instruction, embodying
this section of the Motor Vehicle Law and
the exceptions, and held to be nonprejudicial
and not objectionable as stating the last
clear chance doctrine.
Negligence.
The strongest kind of presumption of
negligence prevails against party driving on
wrong side of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1918) 52 U 426, 174 P 821.
Where one who is operating his vehicle on
right-hand side of street makes survey of
condition of street ahead of him, and in
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doing so he observes no one coming on his
side of street, but sees one or more coming
towards him on opposite side of street, he
has right to assume that such person will
continue onward on opposite side of street,
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v.
Palace Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P
439.
Presumption.
In action by bicyclist for injuries sustained
in collision with autotruck when plaintiff was
thrown in front of defendant's oncoming
vehicle, held driver of autotruck had legal
right to presume that plaintiff would not
encroach upon his side of street, and to hold
defendant liable, plaintiff was required to
prove more than mere fact that autotruck
could have been stopped or turned aside in
distance of 10 or 15 feet. Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439.
Questions of law and fact.
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile at intersection, whether bicyclist was on
right side of traveled road held for jury.
Cheney v. Buck (1920) 56 U 29, 189 P 81.
In personal-injury action arising out of
automobile-truck collision on highway, ulti-

mate question of fact as to which of two drivers failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side
of road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op.
Mercantile Institution (1948) 114 U 58, 197 P
2d 136.
Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254.
Collateral References.
Automobiles cS=>153.
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 268.
Portion of highway to be used; following,
approaching, and passing other vehicles, 7A
AmJur 2d 434 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 260 et seq.
Duties imposed by statute where motor
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the
right, 48 ALR 2d 233.
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR
1304, 63 ALR 277, 113 ALR 1328.
Validity of regulations as to part of street
to be used by moving vehicles, 29 ALR 1348.

41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. Drivers
of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic
in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of
the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.
L. 1941, ch. 52, § 44; C. 1943,

construing similar section of the statutes of
that state.

Construction and application.
Where this section refers to half the roadway, it means half of the roadway as it exists
at the time it is being traveled, and not half
the roadway as it may have been laid out
originally. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 109 U
487, 167 P 2d 282, following Dixon v. Alabam
Freight Co. (1941) 57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584,

Collateral References.
Automobiles cS=>170(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 306.
Vehicles proceeding in opposite directions,
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and Highway
Traffic § 265; 7A AmJur 2d 1100 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic§ 839 et seq.

History:
57-7-121.

41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations,
exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated:
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the
overtaken vehicle.
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(b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the
driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the
overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of
his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
History:
57-7-122.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 45; C. 1943,

Construction and application.
The rule, whether statutory or decisional,
which requires driver of vehicle overtaking
another proceeding in same direction to pass
to the left at a safe distance, imposes a high
degree of care commensurate with the circumstances involved. The driver attempts to
pass at his peril, and the situation facing him
must be such as to reasonably assure an ordinarily prudent driver that the passing can be
accomplished with safety to all occupants of
the road. Maragakis v. United States (1949)
172 F 2d 393.
In action for wrongful death of elevenyear-old boy, two instructions, one based on
subsec. (b) of this section, the other, conforming with subsec. (a) of 41-6-146, to the
effect that driver of vehicle intending to pass
another vehicle does not, under all circumstances, owe duty of sounding horn, but
sounding of horn is left to judgment of operator in exercise of due care, were not inconsistent, where instructions dealt with different fact situations. Manning v. Powers (1950)
117 U 310, 215 P 2d 396.
Duty to sound horn.
Instruction that driver of automobile had
no duty to sound horn upon attempting to
pass another vehicle was objectionable on
basis that while there is no general duty to
sound his horn, driver does have duty to give
audible warning of approach and intention to
pass where it would appear from all circumstances that such warning is reasonably
necessary to ensure safe operation. Barton v.
Jensen (1967) 19 U 2d 196, 429 P 2d 44.
Evidence.
In action under Federal Tort Claims Act,
evidence disclosed that driver of government
vehicle failed to exercise due care in placing
himself in position of peril by attempting to

pass to the left of plaintiffs' vehicle.
Maragakis v. United States (1949) 172 F 2d
393.
Questions of law and fact.
Whether defendant violated this section by
passing on wrong side of road and failing to
s~und his horn is question of ~act ordinarily.
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshmg Mach. Co.
(1915) 46 U 502, 151 P 53.
Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violation of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles cS=:>
172(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 326.
7A AmJur 2d 436-442, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 262-265.
Duties imposed by statute where motor
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the
right, 48 ALR 2d 233.
Duty and liability of overtaken driver with
respect to adjusting speed to that of passing
vehicle, 91 ALR 2d 1260.
Giving audible signal where driver's view
ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, duty and
liability with respect to, 16 ALR 3d 897.
Reciprocal duties of driver of automobiles
or other vehicles proceeding in same direction, 24 ALR 507, 47 ALR 703, 62 ALR 970,
104 ALR 485.
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities
where driver of motor vehicle attempts to
pass on right of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, 38 ALR 2d 114.
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of
motor vehicles proceeding in same direction,
where one or both attempt to pass on left of
another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR 2d 317.

41-6-56. Passing upon right - When permissible. (1) The driver of
a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only
under the following conditions:
(a) When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn;
(b) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for
two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle;
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(c) Upon a one-way street, or upon any roadway on which traffic is
restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehicles.
(2) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon
the right only under conditions permitting such movement with safety.
Such movement shall not be made by driving off the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 46; C. 1943,
57-7-123;L. 1949,ch. 65, § 1; 1978,ch. 33, § 12.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subds. (l)(b)
and (lXc); and rewrote subsec. (2) which
read: ''The driver of a vehicle may overtake
and, allowing sufficient clearance, pass
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction either upon the left or upon the right on
a roadway with unobstructed pavement of
sufficient width for four or more lines of
moving traffic when such movement can be
made in safety."
The 1978 amendment deleted "not occupied
by parked vehicles" after "pavement" near
the beginning of subd. (l)(b); substituted
"vehicles moving lawfully in the direction
being traveled by the overtaking vehicle" at
the end of subd. (l)(b) for "moving vehicles
in each direction"; deleted "allowing sufficient clearance" before "pass" near the
beginning of the subsec. (2); and made minor
changes in phraseology, punctuation and
style.
Collateral References.
Automobiles cS=:>172(2).

60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 326.
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 265.
Collision between automobile making
U-turn and another vehicle, liability arising
from, 6 ALR 2d 1244.
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 ALR
1178.
Failure of motorist to give signal for left
turn between intersections, liability for accident arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103.
Operation of statutory regulation where
driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on
right of other vehicle proceeding in same
direction, 38 ALR 2d 123.
Passing vehicle, duty and liability of overtaken driver with respect to adjusting speed
to that of, 91 ALR 2d 1260.
Right of way at street or highway intersections, 21 ALR 974, 37 ALR 493, 47 ALR 595.
Violation of regulation requiring one
intending to turn left at intersection to
approach in traffic lane nearest to center of
street or.highway, 87 ALR 1165.
Violation of statute by motorist's failure to
give signal for left turn at intersection with
respect to motor vehicle proceeding in same
direction, 39 ALR 2d 32.

41-6-57. Limitation on passing. No vehicle shall be driven to the left
side of the center of the roadway in overtaking or passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the
operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of any
vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to an
authorized lane of travel as soon as practical and in the event that the
passing movement involves the use of a lane authorized for vehicles
approaching in the opposite direction before coming within 200 feet of any
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 47; C. 1943,
57-7-124;L. 1975, ch. 207, § 15.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "overtaking or passing" for "overtaking and pass-

ing" near the beginning of the first sentence;
deleted "safe" before "operation of any vehicle approaching" in the first sentence; and
substituted "return to an authorized lane * *
* before coming within 200 feet of any vehicle" in the second sentence for "return to the
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right-hand side of the roadway before coming within 100 feet of any vehicle."
Application.
Vehicles are not always prohibited from
using their left side of the highway; and
when they do so in conformity with law and
in due care, it is not negligence. Thus where
defendant turned his car to the left in order
to see around a truck and see if it were clear
to pass, and was then struck by plaintiff's car
coming in the opposite direction, it was not
negligence on the defendant's part. Weenig
Bros. v. Manning (1953) 1 U 2d 101, 262 P 2d
491.
Collateral References.
Automobiles P 172(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 326.

41-6-58

7A AmJur 2d 436, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.
Construction, applicability, and effect of
traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from
passing one another at street or highway
intersection, 53 ALR 2d 850.
Duty in operating automobile at curve or
on hill, 57 ALR 589.
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles
or other vehicles proceeding in the same
direction, 104 ALR 485.
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities
where driver of motor vehicle attempts to
pass on right' of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, 38 ALR 2d 114.
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of
motor vehicles proceeding in same direction,
where one or both attempt to pass on left of
another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR 2d 317.

41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exceptions.
(a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven on the left side of the roadway
under the following conditions:
(1) When approaching or upon a crest of a grade or a curve on the highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance as to create
a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach from the opposite
direction.
(2) When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection
or railroad grade crossing.
(3) When the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of
any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel.
(b) The foregoing limitation shall not apply upon a one-way roadway,
nor under the conditions described in section 41-6-53 (a) (2) nor to the
driver of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 48; C. 1943,
57-7-125;L. 1975, ch. 207, § 16.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "on the
left side" for "to the left side" in the first
sentence of subsec. (a); substituted "or upon
a crest of a grade or a curve on the highway"
for "the crest of a grade or upon a curve in
the highway" near the beginning of subd.
(a)(l); and added "nor under the conditions
described * * * road or driveway" to subsec.
(b).
Driving to left side of road within 100 feet
of intersection.
It was held that lower court properly
directed a verdict of no cause of action where
plaintiff did not make tum at intersection,
but south of intersection some 50 feet. Hart
v. Kerr (1946) 110 U 479, 175 P 2d 475.

"Intersection."
Jury was properly instructed that site of
collision was "intersection" under statute in
light of evidence that crossing road intersected main highway from both east and
west and crossed it at right angles, that main
highway was widened for about 1/10 of a
mile in both directions to provide extra lane
for acceleration and deceleration in entering
or leaving highway and that th.ere-were stop
signs at both east and west side to warn
oncoming traffic; result was not changed by
fact that crossing road was only infrequently
traveled dirt road and not readily observable
to main highway traveler. Hathaway v. Marx
(1968) 21 U 2d 33, 439 P 2d 850.
Passing within 100 feet of intersection.
An instruction that a driver had no right
in attempting to pass at an intersection was
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error where, at the point where the collision
occurred there were no markers prohibiting
passing, there was nothing to indicate a
turn-off road from the highway, and no
markers showing that a road left the highway in the area. Douglas v. Gigandet (1958) 8
U 2d 245, 332 P 2d 932.
Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles P 153.

60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 268.
7A AmJur 2d 440, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 263.
Giving audible signal where driver's view
ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, duty and
liability with respect to, 16 ALR 2d 897.
Responsibility for collision at night of
automobiles, one of which, with lights on, is
standing or moving on wrong side of road, 59
ALR 590.
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR
1304, 63 ALR 277, 113 ALR 1328.
Statutes regulating or forbidding passing
on hill by vehicle, construction and application of, 60 ALR 2d 211.
Street or highway intersection within traffic rules, definition, 7 ALR 3d 1204.

41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway - No passing zones Exceptions. (1) The department of transportation and local authorities
are authorized to determine those portions of any highway under their
respective jurisdictions where overtaking and passing or driving on the left
of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate
signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such
zones and when such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible
to an ordinarily observant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey the
directions thereof.
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone
as set forth in paragraph (1), no driver shall at any time drive on the left
side of the roadway within such no-passing zone or on the left side of any
pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone throughout its
lengths.
(3) This section does not apply to the conditions described in section
41-6-53(a) (2) nor to the driver of a vehicle turning left onto or from an
alley, private road or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 49; C. 1943,
57-7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 17; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 13.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment designated the
former section as subsec. (a); inserted "and
local authorities" near the beginning of
subsec. (a); inserted "under their respective

jurisdictions" in subsec. (a); added subsecs.
(b) and (c); and made minor changes in
phraseology.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); substituted "department of transportation" for "state road commission" near the beginning of subsec. (1);
and made minor changes in phraseology.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Violation as question of fact.
Violation of statute providing that driver
shall not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent is question of
fact to be determined by trier of facts with

result that appellate court could not say that
as matter of law that lower court should
have directed verdict in favor of plaintiff
because defendant had violated statute.
Fairbourn v. Lloyd (1968) 21 U 2d 62, 440 P
2d 257.
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41-6-60. One-way traffic - Signs. (a) The department of transportation and local authorities may designate any highway, roadway, part of
a roadway or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which
vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at all or such times as shall
be indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall
be driven only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only
to the right of such island.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943,
57-7-127; L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 15.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section
which read: "(a) The state road commission
may designate any highway or any separate
roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way
traffic and shall erect appropriate signs
giving notice thereof. (b) Upon a roadway

designated and signposted for one-way traffic
a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction
designated."
The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for "state road commission" in subsec. (a).
Collateral References.
Automobiles ¢:;, 14.
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 16.

41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes - Rules - Trafficcontrol devices. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others
consistent herewith shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for
two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center
lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the
same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where such
center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated
by official traffic-control devices.
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to. be used by
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943,
57-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment substituted "two or
more" for "three or more" in the preliminary
paragraph.
The 1975 amendment inserted "and provides for two-way movement of traffic" in
subd. (b); substituted "traveling in the same

direction when such center lane is clear of
traffic within a safe distance" in subd. (b) for
"where the roadway is clearly visible and
such center lane is clear of traffic within a
safe distance"; substituted "such allocation is
designated by official traffic-control devices"
in subd. (b) for "is signposted to give notice
of such allocation"; rewrote subd. (c) which
read: "Official signs may be erected directing
slow-moving traffic to use a designated lane
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or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving
in the same direction and drivers of vehicles
shall obey the directions of every such sign";
and made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); and inserted "or completing" near the middle of subd. (2).

Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ¢;;, 153.
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 274.

41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Proximity and distance Caravan or motorcade - Exception for funeral procession. (1) The
driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
(2) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle
when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district
and which is following another truck or motor vehicle drawing another
vehicle shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy such space without danger, except
that this shall not prevent a truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle from overtaking and passing any vehicle or combinations of vehicles.
(3) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a business
or residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each
such vehicle or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle
to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not
apply to funeral processions.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943,
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "or motor
vehicle" after "any truck" in subsec. (b); and
added subsec. (c).
The 1975 amendment rewrote subsec. (b)
which provided a distance requirement of 150
feet between truck or motor vehicle except
when passing.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); inserted "so that an
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy
such space" in subsec. (2); and inserted
"drawing another vehicle" near the end of
subsec. (2).

Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ¢;;, 172(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 326.
7A AmJur 2d 434-442, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 260-265.
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles
or other vehicles proceeding in the same
direction, 104 ALR 485.

41-6-63. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 41-6-63 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.10,
enacted by L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78,
§ 3; 1959, ch. 67, § 1), relating to distinctive

roadway markings and prohibiting driving to
the left thereof, was repealed by Laws 1975,
ch. 207, § 61. For present provisions, see
41-6-59.
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41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section - Unlawful actions of drivers - Dividing section defined
and described. Whenever a highway has been divided into two separate
roadways by a dividing section, it shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle
upon any such highway except to the right of such dividing section, or to
drive any vehicle over, upon, or across any such dividing section or to make
any left turn or semicircular or U-turn on any such divided highway,
except through a plainly marked opening in such dividing section designed
and designated for such left turn, semicircular or U-turn, unless a sign or
signs authorized and displayed by the department of transportation or
other governmental agency shall otherwise indicate.
A dividing section shall divide a highway into two separate roadways
and shall consist of:
(1) An unpaved dividing area; or,
(2) A physical barrier, curbs, or other clearly indicated dividing area
so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic across the same; or,
(3) A dividing area of over two feet in width defined by either:
(a) A standard double line marking on each side of the dividing section,
each double line marking consisting of two four-inch wide lines four inches
apart, or
(b) Other marking, on each side of the dividing section of a type designated by the department of transportation to indicate no driving along a
highway to the left thereof.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-63.10,enacted by L.
1959,ch. 67, § 2; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 16.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for "state road commission" in two places.

Collateral References.
Automobile accidents on street or highway
divided by parkway or other neutral strip,
165 ALR 1418.

41-6-64. Controlled-access highways - Driving upon and from
highways. No person shall drive a vehicle onto or from any controlled-access highway except at such entrances and exits as are established by
public authority.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-64, re-enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 20; 1978,
ch. 33, § 16; 1979, ch. 242, § 17.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1955, ch. 71, § 1 repealed old section
41-6-64 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.11, enacted by L.
1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating to driving onto or
from limited-access roadways, and enacted
new section 41-6-64.
The 1975 amendment substituted "except
at such entrances and exits as are established by public authority" for "from a local
service road except through an opening provided for that purpose in the dividing curb,

or dividing section or dividing line which separate such service road from the limitedaccess highway proper"; and made minor
changes in phraseology.
The 1978 amendment deleted three subdivisions which read: "(1) drive a vehicle over,
upon, or across any curb, central dividing
section or other separation or dividing line
on limited access highways; (2) make a left
turn or a semi-circular or U-turn except
through an opening provided for that purpose in the dividing curb section, separation
or line; (3) drive any vehicle except in the
proper lane provided for that purpose and in
the proper direction and to the right of the

365

41-6-65

MOTOR VEHICLEE;

central dividing curb, separation section, or
line" after "No person shall" at the beginning of the section; and made a minor change
in phraseology.

The 1979 amendment substituted
trolled-access" for "limited-access."
Cross-References.
Limited-access
27-12-111et seq.

facilities

"con-

generally,

41-6-65. Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or
kind of traffic - Traffic-control devices. The department of transportation by resolution or order entered in its minutes, and local authorities
by ordinance may regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access
roadway within their respective jurisdictions by any class or kind of traffic
which is found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of
traffic.
The department of transportation or the local authority adopting any
such prohibition shall erect and maintain official traffic-control devices on
the controlled-access highway on which such prohibitions are applicable
and when in place no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such
devices.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.12, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 21; 1979,
ch. 242, § 18.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "regulate
or prohibit the use of * * * and safe movement of traffic" in the first paragraph for
"with respect to any limited-access roadway
under their respective jurisdictions, prohibit
the use of any such roadway by pedestrians,

bicycles, or other .nonmotorized traffic, or by
any person operating a motor-driven cycle";
substituted in ·the second paragraph, "highway" for "roadway," "traffic-control devices"
for "official signs"; and made minor changes
in phraseology.
The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for "state road commission" in two places; and substituted "controlled-access" for "limited-access" in two
places.

ARTICLE 8
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING
OR TURNING
Section
41-6-66.
41-6-67.
41-6-68.
41-6-69.

Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices.
Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of grade.
Starting vehicles.
Turning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal flashing prohibited.
41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps.
41-6-71. Signals - Manner of giving.

41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. The driver
of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows:
(1) Right Turns - Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn
shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway.
(2) Left Turns - The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to
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